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Abstract. A people’s culture, norms and habits are important determi-
nants not just of the quality of social life but of economic progress and growth.
In this paper we take the view that while the importance of culture is unde-
niable, the innateness of culture is not. We work here with a single example
and demonstrate how a human trait which is widely believed to be cultural is
at the same time a matter of choice. The example that we shall work with
concerns punctuality. We show that punctuality may be simply an equilibrium
response of individuals to what they expect others to do. The same society can
get caught in a punctual equilibrium or a non-punctual equilibrium.
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1. Introduction
A people’s culture, norms and habits are important determinants not just of the
quality of social life but of economic progress and growth. And indeed there are
certain aspects of habits, preferences and behaviors that we associate with whole
groups of people and think of as the nuts and bolts of culture. When a lay person
∗The writing of this paper has been a veritable exercise in lack of punctuality. We began working
on the paper in early 1997, with the essential ideas already laid out then. Yet, through a series of
what is best described as temporal lapses and procrastination, the paper remained at the level of
notes till earlier this year. During this long process we have accumulated many debts to colleagues
and friends, but suﬃce it to mention here Abhijit Banerjee, Glenn Ellison, Karla Hoﬀ,G e r a i n tJ o n e s ,
Eva Meyersson Milgrom, Lena Palseva and Mark Voorneveld, who all gave helpful comments.
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hypothesizes that a certain nation or social class has done badly because the people
are given to sloth, or when the anthropologist collects evidence to demonstrate that
the Yanomami Indians of South America are so poor because they have little respect
for property rights, or, for that matter, when the Yanomami Indians think of anthro-
pologists as a not quite human group, they are all subscribing to some view of shared
cultural traits and how these traits can have consequences for the quality of life and
well-being of the group in question.1
It is a short step from this to think of culture as something that is pre-ordained,
as something indelibly etched onto a people’s psyche and so beyond the ambit of
their choice. When in 1950 the British Charg´ ed ’ A ﬀaires in Korea, Alec Adams, pro-
nounced how they (the colonial masters stationed in Korea) entertained “the lowest
opinion of Korean mores, ability and industry”, and, more importantly, how he found
it “hard to believe that they will ever be able to successfully govern themselves”, he
was subscribing to this view of innateness of culture (Cliﬀord, 1994, p. 29). This
erroneous prediction, so close to the Korean economic take-oﬀ,c o u l dn o th a v ec o n -
tributed much to Mr. Adams’ reputation as an economic forecaster. However, in his
treatment of culture as something beyond the reach of a people’s choice he was not
alone.
In this paper we take the view that while the importance of culture is undeniable,
the innateness of culture is not; and that societies can constructively think in terms
of breaking out of ’cultural traps’. This is a large topic and we do not expect to do
it justice in this short paper. Instead, we want to work here with a single example in
order to demonstrate how a human trait which is widely believed to be cultural and,
in all likelihood, is so to a large extent, is at the same time a matter of choice. While
each individual may have no interest in opting out of his cultural trait, society as a
whole may have such an interest, and each individual may in fact prefer to change
if he or she had the assurance that so would others. In other words, the same set
of people with the same innate preferences, endowments and abilities can settle into
diﬀerent cultural practices.
The example that we shall work with is punctuality and, by association, with
related concepts such as tardiness, laziness and diligence. As we explain in the next
section, social psychologists often think of punctuality as a cultural trait - something
that is shared by the individuals in a certain group, for instance, a community, social
class, or region. We shall here show that this may be true, but, at the same time,
1While these are meant to be illustrative examples and not statements of fact, that the Yanomami
view anthropologists as a rather special class is, however, probably true. “Anthropologists,” writes
Tierney (2000, p. 14), “have left an indelible imprint upon the Yanomami. In fact, the word anthro
entered the Indians’ vocabulary... . The Yanomami consider an anthro to be a powerful non-human
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punctuality may have little to do with innate characteristics or preferences of the
group. It may be simply an equilibrium response of individuals to what they expect
others to do (and they expect others to expect from them). The same society, in
other words, can get caught in a punctual equilibrium or a tardy equilibrium. This
is not to deny that punctuality may be habit-forming and the habit could be subject
to evolutionary erosion or bolstering. A more detailed work (and maybe our own
future research) will go into this, but our aim here is to focus on one core element
of such a large agenda, namely the fact that punctuality can be both a shared social
trait and an equilibrium response on the part of every individual.
There is nothing analytically novel in what we do. The idea of multiple equilibria
is a familiar one in economics. One of the earliest formal modeling of it in the context
of a social phenomenon was that by Stiglitz (1975), who has in subsequent work
continued to stress its importance in understanding certain social realities, especially
economic under-development and high unemployment (see Stiglitz, 2000; Hoﬀ and
Stiglitz, 2000; Basu, Genicot and Stiglitz, 2002), and there is a now a substantial
literature on the subject. Closer to our current concern there is also a recent literature
concerning coordination over time (e.g., Hvide, 2001; Ostrovsky and Schwarz, 2001).
However, in the equally substantial literature in sociology and social psychology on
punctuality there is very little recognition of this. The aim of this paper is to bring
these two literatures together. We show that punctuality is a phenomenon where
the possibility of multiple equilibria arises very naturally and therefore this ought to
be recognized also in social-psychological analyses of punctuality.
The disposition of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the
literature on punctuality, Section 3 gives a simple example, Section 4 a simple model,
a n dS e c t i o n5c o n c l u d e sb yb r i e ﬂy probing into some deeper aspects of unpunctuality.
A background calculation for the analysis in section 4.1 is provided in an appendix.
2. Punctuality
Punctuality, or the ability of diﬀerent individuals to exchange some words and then
coordinate on time, is one of the crucial ingredients of modern life and progress.
Social scientists - largely outside of economics - who did research on this, appreciated
this fact well. Zerubavel (1982, p. 2) writes: “Standard time is thus among the
most essential coordinates of intersubjective reality, one of the major parameters of
the social world. Indeed social life would probably not have been possible at all
were it not for our ability to relate to time in a standard fashion.” And, following
Durkheim, Clayman (1989, p. 660) observes, “As a general principle, organized social
life requires that human activities be coordinated in time.” Given this realization, it isPUNCTUALITY A Cultural Trait as Equilibrium 4
natural that punctuality has been a subject of intensive research in social psychology
and sociology (see, for, instance, Lockwood, 1930; Mcleary, 1934; Dudycha, 1937,
1938; Levine, West and Reis, 1980; Marin, 1987; Kanekar and Vaz, 1993).
This large social science literature researching into the causes of punctuality seems
to have treated punctuality as a matter of preference or a person’s innate behavior
trait. Thus, underlying Dudycha’s (1938) empirical inquiry into punctuality is the
presumption that people’s punctuality is prompted by their “attitudes towards punc-
tuality,” that punctuality reﬂects a person’s “early training” in school and at home.
B a s e do nas t u d yo f1 5m e na n d2 2w o m e ni nC leveland State University, Richard
and Slane (1990, p. 397) concluded that a person’s “punctuality style is a persis-
tent personality characteristic” and a trait that correlates well with a person’s innate
anxiety level, with punctual people exhibiting less anxiety in general.
These social psychologists and sociologists soon recognized that punctuality is not
entirely an idiosyncratic individual trait, however, but a characteristic that often ex-
hibits systematic variation across groups. Several studies have located systematic dif-
ferences across the genders (for instance, Lockwood, 1930; Dudycha, 1937). But these
diﬀerences seem milder than those across nations or geographical regions. Kanekar
and Vaz (1993) motivate their study of undergraduate students in Bombay University
by observing that (p.377-8) “Indians are notorious for their unpunctuality.”2 In their
celebrated study of punctuality patterns in Brazil and the United States, Levine, West
and Reis (1980) found systematic variations across these two societies. Taking extra
care not to use politically incorrect language, they observe (p. 542) “Brazilians and
people from the United States do diﬀer in their time-related behavior in the direction
predicted by stereotype.”
This raises the question: Why these diﬀerences across nationalities? People have
tried to explain these systematic diﬀerences in terms of deep cultural moorings or
religion, such as the “fatalistic nature of the Latin personality” or the Hindu belief
in determinism. When they have looked for more proximate causes they have found
explanations in disruptive factors in the environment, which make it diﬃcult for
people to have control over time, or clocks and watches which do not function well.
By studying a number of watches in Brazil and the United States, Levine, West and
Reis (1980, p.542) ﬁnd strong evidence in support of their hypothesis that one reason
Brazilians are less punctual is that “public clocks and personal watches [are] less
accurate in Brazil than in the United States.”3 Even in the early study of Dudycha
2In contrast, one of us (Basu) was told by the late Sir Arthur Lewis how he found Indians to be
punctual. It is worth noting that his sample of experience must have been predominantly Indians
in England and the Americas. Our paper will show how the same people may behave diﬀerently
when they ﬁnd themselves in a diﬀerent setting.
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(1938), he found that among the 307 college students surveyed, 20 attributed their
lack of punctuality to “incorrectly set clocks or watches.”
Such explanations leave open some important questions concerning the direction
of causality; but that is not what we are concerned with here. Before describing
our model, it is worth recounting, however brieﬂy, one of the ﬁrst proper empirical
studies of punctuality. Lockwood’s (1930) research is interesting, despite its occa-
sional eccentricities, because it is based on a serious attempt to make sense of data
on tardiness available from school records. During 1928-29 in Rushville High School,
Rushville, Indiana, data were collected from students who arrived late to school and
had to report at the principals oﬃce. They were made to ﬁll up a form asking
for the extent of delay in minutes and the cause of the delay. Lockwood classi-
ﬁed the causes into eight categories: “work”, the inevitable “clock wrong”, “started
late”, “automobile trouble”, “accidental or unusual cause”, “sickness”, the somewhat
baﬄing category of “no reason” and then “overslept”. He explained that he had dif-
ﬁculty classifying some of the declared causes of delay, such as, “Tore my trousers”,
“Held up by a long freight train”, and (here we must express a certain admiration
for the imagination of the student concerned) “Stopped to look at a queer animal in
a store window”. The problem of classifying these were solved by putting them in
the category of “accidental or unusual cause”. In some ways Lockwood was more
carefully about the causality of tardiness than subsequent writers. Thus he notes
(p. 539), “While everyone realizes the great diﬃculty of synchronizing clocks, the
excuse ‘clock wrong’ can in no way justify tardiness.” He found that boys were more
o f t e nl a t et h a ng i r l sb u tg i r l s ,w h e nl a t e ,w e r el a t e rt h a nb o y s . H en o t e dt h a tl a c k
of punctuality could become a habit and concluded that tardiness is more “a parent
problem” than “a pupil problem”.
We recognize that all the above explanations may have some truth. However,
none of them touches on a less obvious explanation, which has little to do with
innate characteristics or preferences or habit, but has much to do with equilibrium
behavior. What we want to show is that even if none of the above factors were
there and in fact even if all human beings were identical, we could get diﬀerences
in punctuality behavior across cultures. Moreover, these diﬀerences could be small
within each nation or community but vary a lot across nations or communities, exactly
as observed. This is because whether we choose to be punctual or not may depend
on whether others with whom we interact are punctual or not. It will be argued
here that it is in the nature of the problem of coordinating over time that the extra
eﬀort needed to be punctual becomes worthwhile if the others with whom one has to
of strangers in India with the question, “Sir, what is the time by your watch?” makes us believe
that time does have an element of watch-dependency in India, similar to Brazil.PUNCTUALITY A Cultural Trait as Equilibrium 6
interact are expected to be punctual. To illustrate the argument, a simple example
and a simple model are presented in the next two sections.
Though our analysis is abstract, we try to capture a kind of social reality which
sociologists have written about, such as how ghetto culture breeds ghetto culture,
making it virtually impossible for an individual to escape it. Hence, our argument
could be thought of as a formalization of Wilson’s (2002, p. 22) observation, “Skills,
habits, and styles are often shaped by the frequency with which they are found in
the community.” (See also Swidler, 1986.)
The basic idea that leads to our explanation of why punctuality is a shared trait
within cultures is not the obvious one that punctuality has externalities, namely, that
one person’s greater punctuality makes life easier for others who have to interact with
him. It is the somewhat more complex idea of how one person’s greater punctuality
increases the worth of the other person’s eﬀort to be more punctual that is germane
to our analysis. Again, as a technical concept this is well known in economics and
arises in the guise of strategic complementarity or supermodularity in game theory
and industrial organization theory. What is interesting is the observation that the
problem of time coordination gives rise to supermodularity so naturally. No special
or contrived assumptions are needed to get this result. It seems to be there in the
nature of things. This is what we will try to demonstrate in the next two sections.
3. Example
Imagine two individuals who have made an appointment. Each individual has two
choices: to be on time or to be late.L e t B be the gain or beneﬁtt oe a c hp e r s o no ft h e
meeting starting on time, and let C be the cost to each person of being on time. Being
late has the advantage that you can ﬁnish what you were doing. If you are reading
a novel and not fussy about being punctual you can ﬁnish the novel and then get
up for your meeting even though that may mean some delay. A punctual person on
the other hand has to put down the novel and leave early. Basically, an unpunctual
person always has the option of being punctual. Hence, it seems reasonable to
assume that being punctual incurs a cost, here captured by C. Assume B>C ,t h a t
is, both individuals are better oﬀ i ft h e ya r eb o t ho nt i m et h a ni ft h e ya r eb o t hl a t e .
If both are on time, then they each thus obtain the “net beneﬁt” or “net return”
B −C>0, while if both are late, then they each by deﬁnition obtain 0 “net beneﬁt”
(the reference value). If one individual is on time and the other is late, then the
meeting starts late, and the punctual individual accordingly obtains the net beneﬁt
−C. The late-comer in this case incurs zero net beneﬁt.
I ft h et w oi n d i v i d u a l sm a k et h e i rc h o i c e sindependently, this interaction can be
represented as a symmetric simultaneous-move game with the following payoﬀ bi-PUNCTUALITY A Cultural Trait as Equilibrium 7
matrix (the ﬁrst entry in each box being the payoﬀ, here net beneﬁt, to the row
player, and the second entry is the payoﬀ to the column player):
on time late
on time B − C, B − C −C, 0
late 0, −C 0, 0
This is a coordination game with two pure Nash equilibria, (on time, on time) and
(late, late), respectively. The strategy pair (on time, on time) is a strict equilibrium:
if an individual expects the other to be on time (with a suﬃciently high probability),
then being late is strictly worse (since by assumption B−C>0). This strategy pair
is also Pareto dominant: it gives each individual the highest possible payoﬀ, B−C,i n
the game. Hence, this is the outcome that both individuals would prefer to happen,
and it is also the outcome that a benevolent social planner would prescribe. However,
also (late, late) is a strict equilibrium: if an individual expects the other to be late
(with a suﬃciently high probability), then the unique best choice is to be late too
(since by assumption C is positive). However, this equilibrium gives a lower payoﬀ
to both individuals than (on time, on time).
On top of these two pure Nash equilibria, there is also a Nash equilibrium in mixed
strategies, in which both individuals randomize between being on time or being late.
This equilibrium probability is the same for both players, and is such that it makes
the other individual indiﬀerent between being on time and being late.4 However, the
mixed equilibrium is unstable in the sense that if one individual expects the other to be
on time with a probability that is slightly above (below) the equilibrium probability,
then it is in that individual’s self interest to be on time with probability one (zero).
Hence, any perturbation of behaviors in a recurrently interacting population will take
the population to one of the strict equilibria.
What prediction does game theory give in this class of games? All three Nash
equilibria are perfect in the sense of Selten (1975), and, viewed as singleton-sets, each
of them is strategically stable in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). Hence,
even the mixed equilibrium survives these demanding reﬁnements of the Nash equi-
librium concept. However, evolutionary game theory rejects the mixed equilibrium:
the equilibrium strategy to randomize between being on time and being late is not
evolutionarily stable (Maynard Smith and Price (1973), Maynard Smith (1982)). A
population playing this strategy can be “invaded” by a small group of “mutants”
who are always punctual: these earn the same payoﬀ on average when meeting the
4In this equilibrium, each player is on time with probability p = C/B.PUNCTUALITY A Cultural Trait as Equilibrium 8
“incumbents” who randomize, but they fare better when meeting each other.5 By
contrast, each of the two pure strategies is evolutionarily stable.
Which of the two pure-strategy equilibria is more likely in the long run if indi-
viduals in a given population (culture, or society) are randomly matched in pairs to
play the above punctuality game? Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young
(1993) provided models with precise predictions for such recurrently played games.
The basic driving force in their models is that individuals most of the time chose the
action which is best in the light of the recent past play of the game. For instance,
if in the recent past virtually all individuals were late, then such and individual will
choose to be late for the next meeting. However, a second driving force is that now
and then, with a small ﬁxed probability, individuals make mistakes or experiments,
and instead play the other action. In both models, the combined long-run eﬀect of
these two forces is that the risk dominant equilibrium will be played virtually all the
time.6 The concept of risk dominance is due to Harsanyi and Selten (1988), and
singles out the equilibrium with the lowest strategic risk, in the sense of being most
robust to uncertainty about the other player’s action.7 In the above punctuality







Likewise, (on time, on time) is risk-dominant under the reversed inequality. In other
words, the long-run outcome is (late,late) if the cost C of leaving early is more than
half the beneﬁt of starting the meeting early.
I nt h en e x ts e c t i o nw eb r i e ﬂy consider a simple model which generalizes the present
example in two relevant dimensions.
5A (pure or mixed) strategy in a symmetric and ﬁnite two-player game is an evolutionarily stable
strategy (ESS) if there is an ”invasion barrier” against all other (pure or mixed) strategies, in the
sense that if the population share playing such a ”mutant” strategy is below this barrier, then its
payoﬀ is on average lower than that to the ”incumbent” strategy, see Maynard Smith and Price
(1973), Maynard Smith (1982), and Weibull (1995).
6As the probability of mistakes or experiments goes to zero, the long-run probability for the risk
dominant equilibrium tends to one.
7Consider any symmetric 2×2 coordination game (such as our punctuality game). One of the two
pure-strategy equilibria is said to risk-dominate the other if the strategy used in the ﬁrst equilibrium
is optimal for a wider range of probabilities - attached to the other player’s equilibrium action - than
the strategy in the other equilibrium. This condition is equivalent to the condition that the unique
mixed-strategy equilibrium in such a game assigns less than probability 1/2t ot h eﬁrst strategy.PUNCTUALITY A Cultural Trait as Equilibrium 9
4. A simple model
Many situations where punctuality matters involve more than two individuals and
there is usually an element of randomness attached to arrival times. Suppose thus
that there are n persons who decide at time t =0t oh a v eam e e t i n ga tt i m et =
1. Just as in the preceding example, the meeting cannot start until all n persons
arrive. We are therefore considering an instance of what are called ‘minimum eﬀort
games’ (Bryant, 1983; Carlsson and Ganslandt, 1998). Each person can plan to
be “punctual” or “tardy,” for example by choosing an early or late departure time.
A punctual person, one who leaves early, arrives at the agreed-upon time t =1
with probability one. As discussed above, tardiness or unpunctuality is naturally
associated with some degree of randomness in behavior, an aspect neglected in the
preceding example (see also section 5). Hence, a tardy person, who leaves late, has
a probability p<1 of arriving on time and a probability 1 − p of “being late”, that
i s ,o fa r r i v i n ga t ,s a y ,t i m et =2 .
Let again B be the beneﬁto rg a i nt oe a c hp e r s o no ft h em e e t i n gs t a r t i n go nt i m e ,
that is, at t = 1 (as opposed to time t =2 ) . A n dl e tC<Bbe the cost to each
person of being punctual (leaving early). If k of the n persons choose to be punctual,
the expected gross beneﬁt (‘gross’ in the sense of not taking account of the cost C of
being punctual) to each person is thus B multiplied by the probability of everybody
being on time. Assuming statistical independence in the delays of “tardy” persons,
the expected gross beneﬁti st h u ss i m p l yB (k)=pn−kB.L e t ∆B(k)d e n o t et h e
increase in the expected gross beneﬁt when, starting with k persons being punctual,
one of the tardy persons chooses to instead be punctual:
∆B(k)=B (k +1 )− B (k)=p
n−k−1(1 − p)B. (2)
Suppose all individuals decide independently whether to be punctual or tardy
(whether to leave early or late), and that each of them strives to maximize his or her
expected net beneﬁt, that is the expected gross beneﬁt of an early meeting minus the
cost of “punctuality” if this is the individual’s choice. If individual i believes that
k other persons will choose to be punctual (leave early), then also i will choose to
be punctual if and only if the resulting increase in the expected gross beneﬁti sn o
less than the cost of punctuality, that is if and only if ∆B(k) ≥ C. Note that the
expected return ∆B(k) to your punctuality increases in the number k of others who
are punctual. This simple model thus illustrates that punctuality has a natural
strategic complementarity (or supermodularity) property: if one more individual is
punctual, then the marginal return to punctuality increases.
It is now easy to see that there may be multiple Nash equilibria in this punctuality
game. For instance, everybody choosing to be punctual (leave early) is an equilibriumPUNCTUALITY A Cultural Trait as Equilibrium 10
if and only if C ≤ ∆B(n−1) = (1−p)B. Likewise, everybody choosing to be tardy
(leave late) is an equilibrium if and only if ∆B(0) = pn−1 (1 − p)B ≤ C. Hence,
both these polar equilibria co-exist if and only if
p
n−1 (1 − p) ≤
C
B
≤ 1 − p .( 3 )
See Figure 1 below, which has the timely-arrival probability p of a tardy person on
the horizontal axis, and the cost-beneﬁtr a t i oC/B on the vertical axis. The four
curves plot the equation C/B = pn−1 (1 − p)f o rn =2 ,3,5,10, respectively, where
lower curves correspond to larger n. Hence, for all parameter combinations (p,C/B)
below the straight line C/B =1− p, “all punctual” is an equilibrium, and for all
parameter combinations (p,C/B)a b o v et h er e l e v a n tc u r v e( d e p e n d i n go nn), “all
tardy” is an equilibrium. As seen in the diagram, multiple equilibria do exist for
a large set of parameter combinations (p,C/B), and this set is is larger the more
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Figure 1: The parameter region where “full punctuality” and “full tardiness”
c o - e x i s t sa se q u i l i b r i a ,f o rn =2 ,3,5,10 (lower curves for higher n).
The simple idea behind this model may hold some clues to tardiness, ineﬃciencies
of several kinds, and to the poor quality of work and other such phenomena observed
in developing countries. It shows how despite having no innate diﬀerence of signif-
icance, two groups can get locked into very diﬀerent behaviors - one where they arePUNCTUALITY A Cultural Trait as Equilibrium 11
all tardy and one where they are all punctual. A social scientist who neglects the
strategic aspect may be tempted to believe that if two societies exhibit sharply diﬀer-
ent behaviors, then they must have innate diﬀerences, such as diﬀerent preferences or
diﬀerent religious outlooks on life or diﬀerent genes. What we have just seen is that
none of this is necessary. Some of the ‘cultural’ diﬀerences that we observe across
societies could simply be manifestations of diﬀerent equilibria in otherwise identical
societies.
In reality certain behaviors tend to become habits. The person may then suﬀer
some ‘dissonance’ cost if he or she has to behave otherwise. It is arguable that
punctuality behavior falls into this category. Hence, even though one’s decision to
being punctual or not may be founded in trying to achieve some objectives, if one
is punctual or unpunctual for a long time one may develop a direct preference for
such behavior. Though it would be interesting to model the possibility of growing
attachment to certain kinds of behavior and dissonance cost associated with trying
to break out of it, we do not embark on such a study here.
There are many other and more direct ways, however, in which the model can
be generalized, so as to accommodate a wider range of situations. For example,
suppose that instead of the meeting only going ahead with a quorum of all n people,
the meeting goes ahead at the early date, t = 1, irrespectively of how many have
arrived, though with a diminished beneﬁt to all present.8 Those who arrive late
simply miss the meeting and obtain utility zero. More speciﬁcally, suppose that if
m individuals are on time, the meeting takes place with these individuals, each of
whom receives the gross beneﬁt A(m), a non-decreasing function of the number m
of individuals who are present at time t = 1. The model above corresponds to the
special case when A(m)=0f o ra l lm<nand A(n)=B.
Suppose that k individuals choose to be punctual (leave early), and hence arrive
on time with certainty. Each of the remaining n−k tardy individuals arrive on time
with probability p. The expected gross beneﬁt to each punctual person is then
P(k)=E [A(k + X)] − C,( 4 )
where (again assuming statistical independence), the random number X of tardy
individuals who happen to arrive on time has a binomial distribution with para-
meters n − k (the number of trials) and p (each trial’s success probability), X ∼
Bin(n − k,p). Likewise, the expected beneﬁt to each tardy person is
T (k)=pE [A(k +1+X
0)], (5)
where X0 ∼ Bin(n − k − 1,p). The same argument as above leads to a suﬃcient
condition for the existence of multiple equilibria, with condition (3) as a special
8We are grateful to Geraint Jones for suggesting this generalization.PUNCTUALITY A Cultural Trait as Equilibrium 12
case. In other words, as long as the payoﬀ to punctuality depends positively on
the number of other individuals who are punctual, the multiple equilibrium structure
emerges naturally.
Another natural modiﬁcation of our simple model is to let people choose departure
time more freely. This is the topic of the following subsection.
4.1. Fine-tuned departure times. In many real-life situations individuals do
not have a binary choice between being “punctual” (leave early) or “tardy” (leave
late). Instead, a whole range of intermediate degrees of punctuality are available
choice alternatives. The departure tim ef o ram e e t i n gc a no f t e nb ec h o s e no na
more or less continuous scale. Suppose, thus, that each individual i can choose his
or her departure time ti anywhere in the time interval [0,1]. Suppose also that
the probability pi that individual i will arrive in time (that is, by time t =1 )i sa
decreasing function of i’s departure time. This is the case, for example, if the travel
time to the venue of the meeting is a random variable with a ﬁxed distribution. Then
pi = Fi (1 − ti), where Fi is the cumulative distribution function of travel time for
the individual (here assumed independent of departure time, but which may depend
on i’s location, mode of transportation etc.). Let Ci (t)b ei’s cost or disutility of
departing at time t, which we assume is decreasing in t. Suppose, for example, that
t h ec o s ti sl o s ti n c o m e :I fi’s wage rate is wi p e rt i m eu n i tu n t i lh eo rs h ed e p a r t s
for the meeting, then Ci (t)=C0 − witi.L e t Bi > 0 denote the gross beneﬁtt o
individual i of a meeting at the agreed-upon time t = 1. Assuming statistically




Fj (1 − tj) − C0 + witi .( 6 )
Suppose all individuals simultaneously choose their departure times. What are
then the equilibrium outcomes? We focus on the special case of two persons with
identically and exponentially distributed travel times. However, in order to keep
the example consistent with the basic model, we truncate the travel-time distribution
so that even the latest departure, at t = 1, results in arrival by t =2f o rs u r e .








In this case, a necessary ﬁrst-order condition for an interior Nash equilibrium (that
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This equation speciﬁes i’s optimal departure time as a function of i’s wage rate,
gross beneﬁt of a punctual meeting, and i’s expectation of j’s departure time (see
Appendix for a derivation). We note that i’s departure time is increasing in i’s wage
rate, decreasing in his or her gross beneﬁt from a punctual meeting, and increasing
in i’s expectation of j’s departure time. Note, in particular, that the higher wage
an individual has, or, more general, the higher an individual’s opportunity cost of
interrupting his or her usual activity, ceteris paribus,t h el a t e rh eo rs h ed e p a r t s-a n d
the more likely it hence is that he or she will be late.
Equation (7) thus speciﬁes the “best-reply curve” for each individual, and the
intersections between these two curves constitute the interior Nash equilibria, see
Figure 2 below, where the solid curve is 1’s best departure time as a function of the
expected departure time of individual 2, and the dashed curve is 2’s best departure
time as a function of the expected departure time of individual 1. When generating
this diagram, we assigned individual 1 a higher wage/beneﬁtr a t i o :w1/B1 >w 2/B2.
Consequently, in both equilibria, individual 2 chooses an earlier departure time than








0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 t1
Figure 2: Interior equilibria in the special case n = 2, truncated exponential travel
times with λ =3 ,w1/B1 =1a n dw2/B2 =0 .3.
Besides these two interior equilibria, there is one equilibrium on the boundary,
namely when both individuals leave as late as possible, t1 = t2 =1 ,i nw h i c hc a s et h ePUNCTUALITY A Cultural Trait as Equilibrium 14
meeting will be late with probability one. That this is indeed is a Nash equilibrium
can be seen directly from equation (6): if one individual is expected to leave at time
1, then the probability is zero for an meeting at that time, and hence it is best for
the other individual to leave as late as possible, that is, at time one.
Note ﬁnally that one of the interior equilibria, the one associated with later de-
parture times, is dynamically unstable: a small shift in j’s departure time gives an
incentive for i to shift his or her departure time in the same direction. Hence, just
as in the introductory example there are two stable “extreme” equilibria and one
unstable equilibrium between these.
5. What is unpunctual behavior?
One question, that we have been on the verge of raising, but did not is: What consti-
tutes unpunctual behavior? The reason why we could get away without confronting
this question directly is because it was obvious in each of the examples considered
above as to which behavior was associated with punctuality and which with the ab-
s e n c eo fi t . B u to n c ew eg ob e y o n ds p e c i ﬁc examples to confront the general question
of what is the essence of the lack of punctuality, we run into a host of conceptual
problems.
A person who is late and unpredictably so is clearly unpunctual. However,
this is a case of suﬃciency, but not necessity, in describing a person as unpunctual.
Problems arise when we go beyond this clear case. Consider, for instance, a person
who invariably shows up half an hour after the time he is supposed to show up. Is
this person unpunctual? It all depends on what we mean by “the time he is supposed
t os h o wu p ” ,t h a ti s ,w h a tw et a k et ob et h eb a s et i m et ow h i c hh ea d d s3 0m i n u t e s .
First consider the case where he comes 30 minutes after whatever time he is told
to come (and maybe he expects other people to come 30 minutes after the time he
tells them to come) and this is common knowledge. In this case we may indeed think
of him as punctual. We will simply have to remember to tell him to come 30 minutes
before the time we wish him to come; and when he invites someone for dinner that
p e r s o nh a st or e m e m b e rt og o3 0m i n u t e sa f t e rt h et i m eh ei sa s k e dt og o . W h e ni n
France you are invited for dinner, something like this is true. Both sides know that
if the announced time for the dinner is 7 p.m., then the intended time is 7.30.
Even here there may be a problem if meetings are called, and dinner guests are
invited, by way of a public announcement o ft h et i m eo ft h em e e t i n go rd i n n e r ,a n d
we live in a society where some people follow the above time convention while others
take the announcement literally. It may then not be possible to ﬁne tune the message
reaching each person, and so the person who is in the habit of arriving 30 minutesPUNCTUALITY A Cultural Trait as Equilibrium 15
late will indeed be late (unless of course the host targets the information for him and
ends up having the other guests arrive early) and will be considered unpunctual. But
if information could be ﬁned tuned appropriately for each person, we would have to
simply think of this person as someone who uses the language diﬀerently.
Now consider the case when the late comer, call him individual i,i sap e r s o nw h o
comes 30 minutes after what he believes is the time he is expected to come. In
this case he is unequivocally unpunctual, and, on top, his behavior becomes hard
to predict when he has to interact with another rational individual. Consider ﬁrst
the case where he has to use a certain facility, for instance, a laboratory or a tennis
court, which can be booked according to a ﬁxed (say, hourly) schedule. If this person
treats the time when the facility is booked for his use as the time he is expected to
show up, then, by virtue of his habit of delay, there will be 30-minutes of loss during
which the facility stands idle, waiting for him. The problem gets messier if there
is another person involved, who, for instance, calls a meeting with i.I f t h e o t h e r
person, say j, who calls the meeting, knows i0st y p e ,s h em a ya s kh i mt oc o m e3 0
minutes before the time j wants him to show up. But if i knows that j knows his
type, he may show up one hour after the time she asks him to come. Then again, if
she knows that he knows that she knows his type, she may give him a time which is
o n eh o u rb e f o r et h ed e s i r e dt i m e ,a n ds oo ni na ni n ﬁnite regress. Indeed, if i’s type
is common knowledge, it is not clear whether it is at all possible for i to communicate
with j about time. Time coordination, in other words, may become impossible with
such a person. However, we would nevertheless not hesitate to call him unpunctual.
In closing it is worth mentioning that while we have, in this paper, considered
problems involving timing decisions alone, it is possible that timing decisions interact
with other kinds of decisions, causing a wider domain of reinforcement. In other
words, instead of one person’s tardiness reinforcing other people’s tardiness, it may
reinforce other kinds of ineﬃciencies in other people. Consider, for example, the
problem of watch synchronization and tardiness. Some social scientists believe, as we
discussed above, that the former causes the latter. Economists, on the other hand,
are usually dismissive of this and think of tardiness as the cause of why people are
content using clocks and watches that do not function properly. The kind of analysis
we undertook in this paper suggests that, in reality, the causality may run in both
directions because we can conceive of an equilibrium in which it is not worthwhile for
watch producers to incur the extra cost needed to produce better watches and this is
because there is so much lack of punctuality around that it is not worthwhile for each
individual to spend much more on a better watch which would help him or her to be
more punctual. In section 1 we wrote about how, as Joseph Stiglitz and others have
suggested, economic under-development may be a kind of sub-optimal equilibrium
in an economy with multiple equilibria. What we are suggesting - and this clearlyPUNCTUALITY A Cultural Trait as Equilibrium 16
needs more research - is that other kinds of social phenomena, such as tardiness or
the lack of ’work culture,’ which are widely observed in less economically developed
countries, may not be purely matters of coincidence but a necessary concomitant of
that equilibrium.
6. Appendix
A necessary ﬁrst-order condition for an interior Nash equilibrium in the model in





















1 − eλtj−λ .
Taking the logarithm of both sides, one obtains















which gives equation (7).
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